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1. Theories of political violence seldom stress socio-economic
deprivation in an absolute sense as an important pre-condition for 
political violence. Instead they tend to identify social forces 
which, if anything, would tend to be weakened by a condition of 
severe poverty and under-nutrition.
The theories of Ted Gurr, for example, at least those of 
some years ago, stress the importance not of discontent arising from 
a state of absolute deprivation, but rather of the frustration of 
expectations —  relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is the 
discrepancy, between people's perceptions of the goods and conditions 
to which they are rightfully entitled, and their perception of the 
goods and conditions they think they are capable of achieving and 
keeping"*^. Relative deprivation can be stimulated, inter alia by 
new wants, successes which comparable groups are achieving and past 
improvements and/or recent setbacks. Hence we see the importance 
of comparisons between groups and over time.
Gurr's paradigm includes essential conditions at an ideological 
and structural level; the presence of a justificatory ideology of 
violence, a perception of partical benefits in violence, the possession 
by dissidents of resources with which to reward violence, and the 
capacity of dissident groups to mobilise and organise for violence.
21Another writer, Muller places even greater emphasis on 
ideological and attitudinal factors: normative justifications for
violence, facilitative social norms or ideologies in the environment 
and perceived utilities of violence. He too, however, places some 
importance on perceptions of relative deprivation stimulated by rank 
disequilibrium and political dissatisfaction. Like Gurr, he sees 
these normative and perceptual factors.as necessary but not sufficient 
conditions. He adds to them, the factors of availability for 
dissident behaviour (e.g. unemployment), the strength of radical
1. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebelj Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1970.
2. Edward N. Muller, Agressive Political Participation, Princeton: 
Princeton Unervisity Press, 1979.
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organisation, the strength, scope and consistency of regime controls, 
the quality of government administration and the strength of sanctions 
against violence generally.
Obviously, then, one cannot assume that propensities to 
political violence will show a simple association with a depth of 
poverty and deprivation. Studies of riots in the United States 
have shown that it is not the most disadvantaged members of black 
communities that riot^.
The importance of the factor of mobilisation has been 
stressed in recent years. Political violence must also be under­
stood not as a form of social deviance or "pathology", but as a 
coherent strategy in cases where the state is unresponsive to or 
itself violently represses the claims of disadvantaged groups in 
society. This has come to be known as the resource mobilisation 
approach to the understanding of political violence ' .
In the basis of existing evidence and literature, therefore, 
it would seem that the political instability of a violent kind cannot 
be traced to mono-causal factors like poverty. 12
1. See a review in L. Schlemmer, Negro Ghetto Riots and South African
Citiesj  Topical Talks Series, Johannesburg: S.A. Institute of
Race Relations, 1968, and M. Bryan, "The Social Psychology of 
Riot Participation" in Marritt and Leggon, Research in Race and 
Ethnic Relations, Voi. I, Greenwich: J.A.I. Press, 1979;
J.A. Geschwender, "Civil Rights Protest and Riots", Social Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 49, 1968, pp.474-484; and C. McPhail, "Civil 
Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of Recent Research",
American Sociological Review, Vol. 36, 1971, pp.1055-1073.
2. See review by Nicola Lloyd, "Ethnic Conflict in a Divided Society: 
The disunited Kingdom", Paper presented at the European Consortium 
for Political Research, Freiburg, Germany, 20-25 March, 1983.
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2. In South Africa oversimple perceptions of the likelihood of
political violence are frequent in popular political debate. It 
is commonly assumed that the preconditions for stability will increase 
if socio-economic conditions improve. Undoubtedly there is some 
truth in this, but the explanations are inevitably oversimple. One 
has to carefully consider the evidence which exists.
In 1981, large scale surveys among blacks were undertaken 
by this author as part of the research programme of the Buthelezi 
Commission1 .^ Included in the surveys were a number of items which 
in both direct and indirect ways were aimed at assessing the strength 
of attitudes conducive to political violence and militancy.
These attitudes are not to be taken as indexes of behaviour. 
They reflect no more than dispositions towards certain kinds of 
behaviour. As such they are no basis for predictions of action.
They do, however, afford an opportunity to study relationships 
between predispositions to political violence and social circumstances. 
Selected results are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
(Readers are referred to the report of the Buthtlezi 
Commission for full technical details of the questions asked, the 
samples and other procedures.)
In Table 1, we note that both in the Witwatersrand and 
Natal samples, the verbally expressed predisposition to militancy 
rises steadily with increasing education. The least educated are 
the least radical. In terms of occupation it is the unskilled 
category which is consistently less radical than the highest status 
group, the non manual group.
1. G.D.L. Schreiner (Chairman) The Buthelezi Commission, Durban: 
H. & H. Publishers, 1982, Vol. I.
TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTIONS OF RESULTS ON ATTITUDES SUGGESTIVE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
OR ACTIVE DISSEN1 ACCORDING TO S0CI0- ECONOMIC BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS AND 
SIZES
(Wi twaters- 
rand)
1 .
N
SAMPLE
(Natal/ 
KwaZul u) 
2.
N
^Disagreement with 
statement: "People 
should be careful in 
politics and avoid 
trouble"
1 . 2.
% %
**After description 
of racially unequal 
country 1 ike South 
Africa, choice of 
the strategy option: 
"Only bloodshed/ 
violence will help"
1 . 2.
/  %
***ANC spontaneously 
chosen as organisation
"important in peoples ' 
lives"
1 . 2.
% %
****Self rating 
as "angry and 
impatient" with 
life in South 
Africa today
1. 2.
% %
Up to Std 2 120 142 28 25 8 20 12 5 48 29
Std 3-6 130 190 48 35 25 18 26 8 52 38
Std 7-9 239 354 60 42 35 16 45 24 54 43
Std 10+ 113 189 73 56 49 34 60 57 71 65
Degree 10 35 90 82 70 35 40 50 80 64
Unemployed 182 287 54 38 33 19 35 18 53 40
Unskil1ed 42 81 39 26 12 16 24 7 47 32
Semi-skilled 51 131 54 43 23 30 32 27 57 49
Non Manual 202 338 63 51 41 21 47 36 62 54
Under R149 pm 312 468 46 36 25 20 29 16 49 38
R150 pm+ 300 442 62 50 36 22 46 36 63 54
Cities - 357 - 51 - 37 - 35 - 45
Small towns - 153 - 45 - 25 - 29 - 56
Rural tribal areas - 248 - 40 - 16 - 25 - 44
Squatters - 152 - 41 - 23 - 17 - 42
Members of voluntary 
organisations 
(excluding Inkatha) 162 352 62 53 40 22 48 38 62 52
Would you agree with what is said or not? "It is best for African people to be careful in politics and not 
get into trouble"
** "There are countries in the world where people of one group are ruled by another group. They do not have jobs 
or education as good as the people who rule them. What should people who want to change things do?"
*** "Which black organisations or parties do people like you think will be important in their lives?"
**** "Here are pictures of how African people like you can feel about life for Africans in South Africa today".
Pictures described with the following statements repeated: "Very happy, just happy, not happy yet not unhappy,
unhappy, angry and impatient".
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The unemployed tend consistently to show higher levels of verbal 
militancy but this group also includes a substantial proportion of 
better-educated school-leavers; hence it is not necessarily the 
unemployment as such which raises the level of militancy.
The lower income category is consistently less militant 
than the higher income category. In Natal , where a socio-geographic 
break-down was possible, the people in the shack areas ("squatters"), 
who are generally in the poorest socio-economic circumstances, are 
also the least militant.
TABLE 2
EXTREME GENERAL DISCONTENT ACCORDING TO DETAILED LEVEL OF PERSONAL INCOME
Proportion "Angry and Impatient"* 
Monthly earnings Witwatersrand Natal/KwaZulu
Unemployed excluded % %
; 1-79 (n 58) 47 (n 131) 27
80-149 (n 107) 42 (n 156) 45
150-199 (n 79) 56 (n 122) 62
200-249 (n 61) 59 (n 109) 43
250-299 (n 50) 52 (n 74) 64
300-399 (n 53) 74 (n 78) 50
400-499 (n 33) 73 (n 43) 53
500 or more (n 24) 83 (n 42) 55
In Table 2, where very detailed breakdowns according to 
personal income are given, the poorest are also the least "angry and 
impatient".. In the results for the Wi twatersrand, the higher income 
levels above R300 per month are associated with marked expressed 
discontent, while in Natal-KwaZulu the pattern fluctuates with the 
notable feature that the very poorest category (those earning less 
than R80 p.m.) are the least discontented with life in South Africa.
The Witwate, srand results suggest a fairly radicalised 
middle class, which is less evident in Durban and Natal. More of the 
middle class in KwaZulu are, of course, civil servants.
6.
There are also many more supporters of Inkatha in the Durban Middle
Class. Inkatha has defined fairly clearly a policy of peaceful or
1)constructive opposition to white rule.
In another nation-wide survey among migrant contract 
workers, conducted in 1982, some of the same items referred to in 
Tables 1 and 2 were repeated and other indexes of militant attitudes 
included. This offered an opportunity to consider the relationship 
between attitudinal predispositions to militancy and income levels 
among a large group whose homes are in rural areas. Results from 
this study appear in Table 3.
TABLE 3.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEEKLY WAGE LEVELS AMONG MIGRANT WORKERS AND INDEXES 
_____________ OF MILITANT DISPOSITION (n 458 1982)__________________________
Weekly
wage
Sample 
si ze
"Angry and Impatient" 
Life in Pass 
general Laws
"If ANC were 
to come secretly - 
most/many would 
help it"
If leaders 
called for 
work stoppage -
"all-would 
stay away"
under R20 20
IT
50
56
55
~ T ~
20
~ ir
30
R20-30 74 36 46 22 24
R31-40 122 40 55 38 47
R41-50 111 30 61 36 39
R51-60 58 21 48 31 43
R61-70 32 34 41 34 50
R71-80 17 35 47 47 53
R80+ 22 36 50 36 27
Can send 
sufficient 
money home 124 21 42 27 36
Cannot send 
suffi cient 
home 457 37 60 36 43
Happy with 
conditions 
in home area 127 18 34 27 29
Angry about 
conditions 
in home area 177 53 77 38 47
1) See L. Schlemmer, "The Stirring Giant: Observations on the Inkatha
and other Black Political Movements in South Africa", in Robert M. 
Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds) , The Apartheid. Regime: Political
Power and Racial Domination. Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1980. pp. 99-126.
6.
There are also many more supporters of Inkatha in the Durban Middle
Class. Inkatha has defined fairly clearly a policy of peaceful or
1)
constructive opposition to white rule.
In another nation-wide survey among migrant contract 
workers, conducted in 1982, some of the same items referred to in 
Tables 1 and 2 were repeated and other indexes of militant attitudes 
included. This offered an opportunity to consider the relationship 
between attitudinal predispositions to militancy and income levels 
among a large group whose homes are in rural areas. Results from 
this study appear in Table 3.
TABLE 3.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEEKLY WAGE LEVELS AMONG MIGRANT WORKERS AND INDEXES 
_____________ OF MILITANT DISPOSITION (n 458 1982)__________________________
Weekly
wage
Sample
size
"Angry and Impatient" 
Life in Pass 
general Laws
"If ARC were 
to come secretly - 
most/many would 
help it”
If leaders 
called for 
work stoppage - 
:'a'll ■ would 
stay away"
under R20 20
%
50
jT
55
~ T ~
20 30
R20-30 74 35 46 22 24
R31-40 122 40 55 38 47
R41-50 111 30 61 36 39
R51-60 58 21 48 31 43
R61-70 32 34 41 34 50
R71-80 17 35 47 47 53
R80+ 22 36 50 36 27
Can send 
sufficient 
money home 124 21 42 27 36
Cannot send 
sufficient 
home 457 37 60 36 43
Happy wi th 
condi tions 
in home area 127 18 34 27 29
Angry about 
conditions 
in home area 177 53 77 38 47
1) See L. Schlemmer, "The Stirring Giant: Observations on the Inkatha
and other Black Political Movements in South Africa", in Robert M. 
Price and Carl G. Rosberg (eds), The Apartheid Regime: Political
Power and Racial Domination. Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1980. pp. 99-126.
7.
Here the patterns which emerge are somewhat different. 
The very poorly paid migrants are less inclined to suggest 
support for the ANC than the better-paid and are as little 
inclined to suggest support for the general strike as the very 
well-paid (the greatest militancy is in the middle income groups). 
The poorly paid are no more inclined to be angry about the "pass 
laws" than the more affluent. However, in terms of general 
frustration ("Angry and impatient about life in general") the 
very low wage earners are more discontented than the middle-income 
groups.
There is a suggestion, then, that severe financial 
constraints are associated with heightened attitudinal militancy 
among migrant workers. This relationship is supported by the fact 
that those who feel they are not able to send sufficient money 
home are more "militant" than those who feel that they can, 
although the relationship is not very powerful.
A more powerful relationship seems to pertain between 
militant attitudes and a high degree of discontent with perceived 
conditions in their rural home areas. Anger at conditions in 
home areas is associated with one of the highest readings on 
militant rejection of influx control laws obtained in the whole 
survey (77%). These laws, of course, block the escape from 
rival poverty of many migrant contract workers.
3. BROAD CONCLUSIONS
The empirical results obtained in the 1981 surveys, 
predominantly among urban dwellers, support the relative deprivation 
thesis in very broad terms. It is the better-paid and better- 
educated people whose expectations are raised who are most likely 
to express attitudes suggestive of a predisposition to militancy.
Among contract migrants from rural homeland areas, however, 
the position is more complex. While the more poorly paid migrants are
8.
less "political1' in their discontent (lower support for political 
movements or strategies than others) they evince greater generalised 
discontent than the better-paid people. There also appears to be 
a relationship between attitudes of militancy and the conditions for 
people in the rural labour-sending areas.
Generally speaking, poverty seems to be associated with 
low political consciousness among blacks in urban/peri-urban 
areas. Among contract migrants from rural areas, however, the 
frustrations of very low wages and poor conditions do appear to 
manifest in generalised discontent and in a sharp rejection of 
specific constraints in their situation.
These patterns of course pertain to black people under 
conditions of little or no mobilisation and organisation. If one 
inspects the results in Table 1 for members of voluntary organisations 
(virtually all non-political) one notices that higher levels of attitudinal 
militancy exist than in the rest of the populations studied. In part 
this is due to the higher socio-economic status of members of voluntary 
organisations and to the greater politicisation which goes with higher 
education. In the Witwatersrand sample, however, the socio-economic 
advantage of members of organisations over non-members is negligible, 
and the conclusion holds that membership of organisations is associated 
with more politically muscular attitudes. The relatively greater 
militancy of poorer migrants, albeit of a non-ideological kind, perhaps 
reflects their greater social cohesion in the homeland tribal 
organisation. Urban poor are more atomised and demoralised, as are 
most squatters. In the latter case one must bear in mind that certain 
squatter areas, like Crossroads in the Cape, have developed social 
cohesion and may be more militant than the Natal squatters.
If poorer people were to become more organised into voluntary 
associations, they might very well develop new patterns of attitudes in 
response to greater confidence and a sense of collective solidarity, 
even in the urban areas where the very poor are least radical at the 
moment.
21 .4.1983.
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